

Trustworthy Computing,  
Academic Advisory Board - July '05

## **Internet Explorer 7: Secure By Design and Default**

Rob Franco, Lead Program Manager  
Internet Explorer

# About this presentation

- Overview
- In this presentation, we will cover:
  - Guiding principles
  - High level browser threat model
    - Data flow and Architecture of IE
    - Threats for UI, Network request and Page Rendering layers
  - How IE7 addresses the threats
    - Phishing-filter mitigation
    - Window restrictions update
    - Safer UI for security decisions and browser settings
    - Unified URL parsing architecture
    - Cross Domain Architecture Updates
    - ActiveX mitigations
    - Buffer overruns mitigations
    - Low-rights IE mitigation on Vista

# Guiding principles


- Balance our customers' need for browsing that's powerful but also secure
  - Architectural changes eradicate classes of vulns
  - Mitigations reduce severity or prevent future vulns
  - Security Updates address targeted issues and variations
- Every release goes through threat modeling, penetration testing and code analysis tools

# Browser security


## Data flow

- Outbound:
  - URLs
  - HTTP requests
  - Auth and cookie data
- Inbound:
  - URLs
  - HTML
  - Script
  - Non-IE files





# User Interface



# User Interface

Browser Helper Objects

Toolbars

MIME Filters

BrowseUI

ShDocVw

MSHTML

URLMON

WININET

ActiveX Controls

Scripting Engines

Binary Behaviors

## User Interface

BrowseUI



ShDocVw



MSHTML

## Page Rendering

ActiveX Controls

Scripting Engines

Binary Behaviors

Browser Helper Objects

Toolbars

MIME Filters

URLMON

## Network request layer

WININET




# Threats in User Interface



## Sample Threats:

- URLs parsed incorrectly
  - Domain spoofed
  - buffer overrun
  - User can't read URL
- Dangerous files launch & install
  - User clicks "OK"
  - Logic error in prompt
- Scripted Windows trick user
  - Overlays UI warnings
- User lowers security settings


# Threats in Network Request Layer



## Sample Threats:

- Auth Credentials encryption cracked
- URL parsed incorrectly
  - buffer overrun
  - Security settings not enforced
- Data sniffer buffer overrun or logic failure
- Faulty pluggable protocol loads

# Threats in Page Rendering



## Sample Threats

- URLs parsed incorrectly
  - buffer overrun
  - Page Access rules fail
- HTML parser buffer overrun
- Faulty COM object loads
- Page Access rules fail
  - Unsafe access defaults
  - Page Redirects

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    - ActiveX mitigations
    - Buffer overruns mitigations
    - Low-rights IE mitigation on Vista

# Threats in User Interface



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## User Interface

BrowseUI



ShDocVw



MSHTML

## Page Rendering

ActiveX Controls

Scripting Engines

Binary Behaviors

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Toolbars

MIME Filters


## Network request layer

URLMON



WININET

# Threats in Page Rendering



## Sample Threats

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
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# Demonstration: Spoof-proof

In this demonstration, you will learn how Internet Explorer 7:

- Uses a dynamic Phishing-Filter to protect users from phishing sites
- Uses heuristics to detect suspicious sites
- Highlights the user experience for secure sites (SSL)



## Microsoft Phishing Filter



Do you want to automatically check the websites you visit?

Phishing Filter will warn you if the website you are visiting might be impersonating a trusted website.

Website addresses will be sent to Microsoft to be checked against a list of reported phishing websites. Information received will not be used to personally identify you.

For more information, read [Internet Explorer's privacy statement](#).

Yes

No

Ask Me Later



[How does Phishing Filter help protect me?](#)

Microsoft Web-MSWeb

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

http://newsweb/default.aspx

MSN Search

Links

my Site Help

Microsoft

UPDATED THURSDAY, JULY 28, 2005

Top Taskbar: I Need to Find... Search Advanced Search Search Tips

**News**

- Industry News
- World News
- News Archive

**Look It Up**

- Directory
- Library
- Org Browser

**Corporate Services**

- Campus
- Travel
- Workplace Services
- Purchasing
- Vendors

**About Microsoft**

- Company Overview
- History & Culture
- What's Shipping

**Core Businesses**

- Business Solutions
- Home & Entertainment

**Security Alert: eTrust Required by Aug. 15**

All work systems connected to the Microsoft corporate network are required to run Microsoft's site-licensed antivirus software, eTrust. Beginning Aug. 15, any system found not to be running eTrust will be disconnected from the network.

**Alchin: A Window Into Vista**

Q&A: Jim Alchin, group vice president managing all Windows development work, discusses the beta release of Vista, its features and limitations, and hurdles remaining before the software's eventual launch.

**OTHER TOP STORIES**

- Bellini: Our Achievements And Growth In FY05
- Empowering People With Disabilities
- Reminder: Company Picnic Is This Weekend

Subscribe to News Alerts

**BREAKFAST SERIES**

The Word From Wall Street

**CALENDAR OF EVENTS**

Date	Event
7/28/2005	A Conversation with Microsoft's CEO Ron Markezich: Employee Productivity
7/29/2005	Breakfast Series: The Word from Wall Street
7/30/2005	Microsoft Company Picnic
7/31/2005	Microsoft Night With The Seattle Storm!
8/1/2005	TedReady1 - Live Meetings Available

See more events

**Glossary Lookup**

Enter acronym or term

**DIRECTORY**

**Key Sites**

- Classifieds, eCompany Store, eHireWeb, eTravel, eWeb, eNews, eMicrosoft.com, eMS Dining, Library, eMSI, eMSBAC

**CAMPUS**

- Food
- Maps & Building Services
- Meeting Rooms
- more...

**HR & BENEFITS**

- Benefits
- Giving
- Human Resources
- more...

**PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

- Brand
- Bugs
- Dev Tools
- more...

**PRODUCTS & TECHNOLOGIES**

Opening page http://192.168.37.61/phishing/210.95.13.252/irs/billing.html...

Local intranet



## My Microsoft Billing Account

Microsoft



## Update Payment Method Information

## Payment Method Information

## Payment Method

Payment Method Type

Visa  
MasterCard  
American Express  
Discover

Credit Card Number

Expiration Date

01 2004

CVC2 (What is this ?)

Enter your 4-digit PIN.  
Personal Identification  
Number for your ATM card

Save Changes

©2004 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.



**Phishing Filter has determined that this is a reported phishing website.**

http://192.168.37.61/phishing/210.95.13.252/mcn/billing.html

**We recommend that you close this webpage and do not continue to this website.**



[Click here to close this webpage.](#)



[Continue to this website \(not recommended\).](#)



[What Is Phishing Filter?](#)

[Report that this is not a phishing website.](#)

**Phishing Filter has determined that this is a reported ph**

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[What Is Phishing Filter?](#)

[Report that this is not a phishing website.](#)

**Reported phishing website**

Phishing Filter has determined that this is a reported phishing website.

We recommend you do not give any of your information to such websites. Phishing websites impersonate trustworthy websites for the purpose of obtaining your personal or financial information.

[Report that this is not a phishing website.](#)

[What is Phishing Filter?](#)

## My Microsoft Billing Account

Microsoft



## Update Payment Method Information

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01



2004



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WELCOME

MY citi

[HOME](#) | [ACCOUNTS](#) | [PAYMENTS & TRANSFERS](#) | [INVESTMENTS](#) | [ACCOUNT SERVICING](#)

### sign on

ATM/Debit Card  
(CIN) / Card #

ATM PIN #

User ID

Password

To verify your identity enter your login and  
password that you use to login on our site!

Your information is  
transmitted using  
128-bit SSL  
encryption.

sign on

http://192.168.37.61/phishing/211.158.34.250/citi/index.html

Suspicious Website

Please fill the form below and then submit it to our secure server.

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

**citi** WELCOME

MY citi

HOME | ACCOUNTS | PAYMENTS & TRANSFERS | INVESTMENTS | ACCOUNT SERVICES

sign on

ATM/Debit Card (CIN) / Card #

ATM PIN #

User ID

Password

To verify your identity enter your login and password that you use to login on our site!

Your information is transmitted using 128-bit SSL encryption.

sign on

Suspicious website

Phishing Filter has determined that this might be a phishing website.

We recommend you do not give any of your information to such websites. Phishing websites impersonate trustworthy websites for the purpose of obtaining your personal or financial information.

Report whether or not this is a phishing website.

What is Phishing Filter?

Local intranet

start

MSA\_Press



Microsoft PowerPoint...



PowerPoint Slide Sh...


Registry Editor

Please fill the form ...

12:35 PM










# Demonstration: Spoof-proof

In this demonstration, you will learn how Internet Explorer 7:

- Uses a dynamic Phishing-Filter to protect users from phishing sites
- Uses heuristics to detect suspicious sites
- Highlights the user experience for secure sites (SSL)

# Window restrictions update

## IE6 Sp1: sites overlay UI with a window






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## Outlook Web Access Login



For best OWA performance, click the link that corresponds to your Exchange server:

[Charlotte \(CLT\)](#)  
[Europe \(EUR\)](#)  
[MMS Internal](#)  
[Redmond \(RED\)](#)  
[San Paulo \(SPA\)](#)  
[Singapore \(SGP\)](#)  
[Exchange Desktop](#)  
[Windsley](#)  
[WinSE](#)

## FAQ

Why does my OWA session automatically time out?

How do I open Information Rights Management (IRM) protected e-mail?

How do I access e-mail with RPC over HTTP or on a handheld device?

Log On to OWA

OWA FAQ

RAS &amp; Remote E-Mail



Microsoft Office

Outlook Web Access

Provided by Microsoft Exchange Server

Microsoft

Domain/alias:

Password:

Log On

☐ I want to use the Basic version of OWA ([more info...](#))

## Security

☐ I'm using a Private computer that complies with the Microsoft security policy. ([more info...](#))

To protect your account from unauthorized access, Outlook Web Access automatically closes its connection to your mailbox after a period of inactivity. If your session ends, refresh your browser, and then log on again.





## My Microsoft Billing Account

Microsoft



## Update Payment Method Information

## Payment Method Information

## Payment Method

Payment Method Type

Visa  
MasterCard  
American Express  
Discover

Credit Card Number

Expiration Date

01 2004

CVC2 (What is this ?)

Enter your 4-digit PIN.  
Personal Identification  
Number for your ATM card

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Check This Website  
Turn On Automatic Checking...  
Report This Website  
Phishing Filter Settings...

Local intranet

Done



NDA\_Preso

Microsoft PowerPoint...

PowerPoint Slide Sh...

Registry Editor

My Microsoft Billing ...

12:44 PM





## My Microsoft Billing Account

Microsoft



## Update Payment Method Information

Payment Method	Phishing Filter
Payment Method	<div> Website addresses will be sent to Microsoft to be checked against a list of reported phishing websites. Information received will not be used to personally identify you. For more information, read <a href="#">Internet Explorer's privacy statement</a>.</div>
Credit Card Number	<div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Don't show this again <span>OK Cancel</span></div>
Expiration Date	<div> <a href="#">How does Phishing Filter help protect me?</a></div>
CW2 (What is...)	
<div>Enter your 4-digit PIN (Personal Identification Number for your ATM card)</div> <div></div>	

[Save Changes](#)

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**Phishing Filter has determined that this is a reported phishing website.**

http://192.168.37.61/phishing/210.95.13.252/mcn/billing.html

**We recommend that you close this webpage and do not continue to this website.**

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- [Continue to this website \(not recommended\).](#)

- [What Is Phishing Filter?](#)
- [Report that this is not a phishing website.](#)

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
[Report that this is not a phishing website.](#)

[What is Phishing Filter?](#)



# Window restrictions update


## IE6 Sp1: sites overlay UI with a window






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
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
# Window restrictions update

## IE6 Sp1: sites overlay UI with a window



# Window restrictions update

- IE6 for SP2
  - Blocks unwanted pop-ups
  - Prevents windows from drawing larger than the screen
  - Adds a status bar to all IE windows
  - Prevents border-less windows from covering UI



# Window restrictions update


## IE7: all windows have visible address

- Address bar on every pop-up window



- Restrictions on the behavior of prompts running in Tabs

# Safer Security Settings



*Note: Windows Server 2003 has stricter defaults than other versions of IE*



# Safer Security Settings

## IE6 SP1 security settings

- My Computer zone
  - Not shown in the UI
  - Any HTML content on the local machine
  - LOW--, Unrestricted access to scriptable APIs
- Trusted sites
  - Empty unless configured
  - LOW, sites can silently install signed ActiveX
- Intranet
  - Machine names in your domain
  - MED-LOW, Automatic domain login
- Internet
  - Fully-qualified domain names
  - MED, Only uses safe extensibility
- Restricted sites
  - Empty unless configured
  - HIGH, only renders HTML, loads no extensions



# Safer Security Settings

## IE7 security settings

- My Computer zone
  - **HIGH** when used in IE
- Trusted sites
  - Empty unless configured
  - **MED**, only uses safe extensibility
- Intranet
  - **Disabled** on Consumer PCs
  - MED-LOW, Automatic domain login
- Internet
  - Fully-qualified domains
  - **MED-HIGH**, on Longhorn with Low-rights
- Restricted sites
  - Empty unless configured
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
# Safer Security Settings

## Notification for unsafe settings



Your security setting level puts your computer at risk. Click for more options...

*Shown under address bar*



# Unified URL parsing architecture

- Problems:
  - Special characters complicate URL parsing
    - <http://www.good.com@bad.com>
  - URLs passed as strings, components parsed inconsistently through the stack
- Solutions:
  - Create a single URL parsing function
  - Pass URLs as an pre-parsed object, to each component

# Cross Domain Architecture Updates

Mobile code has to go through a domain check in order to access the element.

**RULE #1 : Only script from the same domain can access an element**

Element	<H>
ID	MyH
Color	Blue
Size	32
Text	Important Data
Domain	www.abc.com



## Important Data

Script	MyH.color="RED"
Domain	www.abc.com

# Unified URL parsing architecture

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Important Data



Script	MyH.color="RED"
Domain	www.evil.com




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


# Cross Domain Architecture Updates

- Problems:
  - Hackers use script protocols to run domain-less script in the navigation codepath
    - Type this in your address bar:  
`javascript:alert(document.body.innerHTML)`
  - Script engines don't always notice redirects
- Solutions:
  - Migrate the script protocol to run as script in the originating page
  - Deny access to script engines that aren't redirect-aware

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[Singapore \(SGS\)](#)  
[Exchange Desktop](#)  
[Windsley](#)  
[WinSE](#)

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How do I open Information Rights Management (IRM) protected e-mail?

How do I access e-mail with RPC over HTTP or on a handheld device?

Log On to OWA

OWA FAQ

RAS &amp; Remote E-Mail



Microsoft Office

Outlook Web Access

Provided by Microsoft Exchange Server

Microsoft

Domain/alias:

Password:

Log On

☐ I want to use the Basic version of OWA ([more info...](#))

## Security


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```

<FORM name=logonForm onSubmit="return S&Action()"
action=javascript:window.location.href=encodeURIComponent(false&url=encodeURIComponent(window.location.href))>
<INPUT type=hidden value=0 name=flags>
<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width=300 align=center border=0 HEIGHT=300>
<TBODY>
<TR height=80>
<TD class=colTop colSpan=2>
<DIV style="MARGIN: 3px; COLOR: #ffffff; HEIGHT: 15px"><STRONG>Outlook Web Access Logon</STRONG></DIV>
<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0>
<TBODY>
<TR style="CURSOR: hand; VAlign: bottom; height=100px">
<TD colspan=2 style="MARGIN-TOP: 1px; MARGIN-BOTTOM: 1px; MARGIN-LEFT: 10px; align="" src="/exchange/ing/CWALogo.jpg" border=0><!-- HEIGHT=50 WIDTH=141--></TD>
<TD colspan=2 style="height=1 align="" src="/exchange/ing/spc.gif" width=95 border=0></TD>
<TD colspan=2 align="center"></TD>
<TD colspan=2 align="center"></TD>
<TD colspan=2 align="center"></TD>
<TR><TD colspan=2><TR></TD></TR>
<TD colspan=2 style="padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px; padding-top: 10px; width=140 rowSpan=2><STRONG>For best OWA performance, click the link that corresponds to your Exchange server:</STRONG><BR><A href="https://mail.microsoft.com/exchange">Charlotte (CLT)</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://mail.microsoft.com/exchange">Europe (EUR)</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://mail.managed.microsoft.com/exchange">NYMS Internal</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://mail.microsoft.com/exchange">Redmond (RED)</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://apps.mail.microsoft.com/exchange">Singapore (APS)</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://exchange.southcentralus.azure.com/exchange">Exchange South Central US</A><STRONG><BR><STRONG><A href="https://mail.windows.microsoft.com/exchange">Windeploy</A><STRONG><BR><A href="https://mail.windows.microsoft.com/exchange">WinSec</A><STRONG><BR><STRONG><STRONG>FAQ</STRONG><BR><A title="Why does my OWA session automatically time out?" style="TEXT-DECORATION: none" href=javascript:makeTop(document.all.tab1, document.all.i01)">Why does my OWA session automatically time out?</A><BR><A title="How do I open Information Rights Management (IRM) protected e-mail?" style="TEXT-DECORATION: none" href=javascript:makeTop(document.all.tab2, secJSwitch(owl, document.all.i04)">How do I open Information Rights Management (IRM) protected e-mail?</A><BR><A title="How do I access e-mail with RPC over HTTP or on a handheld device?" style="TEXT-DECORATION: none" href=javascript:makeTop(document.all.tab3, secJSwitch(owl, document.all.i05)">How do I access e-mail with RPC over HTTP or on a handheld device?</A><BR><IMG height=1 src="/exchange/ing/spc.gif" width=140 border=0></TD>
<TD class=colMid2 VAlign=top colSpan=2>
<DIV id=sec style="DISPLAY: none; WIDTH: 445px; HEIGHT: 385px">
<DIV class=bodyText style="padding-right: 23px; padding-left: 23px; padding-bottom: 13px; overflow: auto; width: 445px; padding-top: 10px; height: 340px"><SPAN style="font-size: 10pt; width: 250px"><STRONG>Outlook Web Access FAQ</STRONG></SPAN><STRONG><A href=javascript:makeTop(document.all.tab1, logon)">Log on to OWA</A><STRONG>
<TABLE class=bodyText style="margin-top: 50px" cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 border=0>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD>
<TD class=owlHeader title="Why does my OWA session automatically time out?" href=javascript:toggleFAQ(owl, document.all.i01)"><STRONG>Why does my OWA session automatically time out?</STRONG></TD><BR>
<DIV id=owl style="display: none; margin-left: 17px">As a security measure, OWA now automatically times out your session after a period of inactivity to reduce the risk of your mailbox being compromised. Your mailbox is more secure because the feature reduces the likelihood of someone accessing your mailbox if you accidentally leave your computer unattended.
</DIV>
<LD><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> You should still use caution when using non-Microsoft IT managed systems (for example, Internet kiosks), because they may be configured to capture keystrokes to gain access to your account and password information.
</LD></LD></DIV></TD></TR>
<TR style="padding-top: 15px">
<TD colspan=2>
<TD colspan=2>
<TD colspan=2>
<TD colspan=2>
<TD colspan=2>


```

# Cross Domain Architecture Updates

- Problems:
  - Hackers use script protocols to run domain-less script in the navigation codepath
    - Type this in your address bar:  
`javascript:alert(document.body.innerHTML)`
  - Script engines don't always notice redirects
- Solutions:
  - Migrate the script protocol to run as script in the originating page
  - Deny access to script engines that aren't redirect-aware



# Safer Security Settings



*Note: Windows Server 2003 has stricter defaults than other versions of IE*

## Buffer overruns mitigations

Element	<IMG>
SRC	..\BufferOverrun.jpg
Domain	www.evil.com

## Parser



<H1>  
<IMG SRC = "xxx...xxx">  
George  
</H1>



```
szImagePath[20];  
Istrcpy(szImagePath,szUserInput);
```

### Problem:

Attacker finds a place where the parser does not check for size of an argument

### Solutions:

IE uses safe memory APIs, automated code review tools and fuzz testing

# Buffer overruns mitigations

<b>Element</b>	<b>&lt;IMG&gt;</b>
SRC	../BufferOverflow.jpg
<b>Domain</b>	<b>www.evil.com</b>

Parser



```
<H1>  
<IMG SRC = \"../xxxx...xxxx\">  
George  
</H1>
```

```
szImagePath[20];  
strcpy(szImagePath, \"../xxxx...xxxx\");
```



## Problem:

Attacker finds a place where the parser does not check for size of an argument

## Solutions:

IE uses safe memory APIs, automated code review tools and fuzz testing

# IE6 running with Admin Rights

IExplore.exe

## Admin-Rights Access

HKLM

Program Files

## User-Rights Access

HKCU

My Documents

Startup Folder

## Temp Internet Files

Untrusted files & settings

# Buffer overruns mitigations

<b>Element</b>	<b>&lt;IMG&gt;</b>
SRC	../BufferOverflow.jpg
<b>Domain</b>	<b>www.evil.com</b>

Parser



```
<H1>  
<IMG SRC = \"../xxxx...xxxx\">  
George  
</H1>
```

```
szImagePath[20];  
strcpy(szImagePath, \"../xxxx...xxxx\");
```



## Problem:

Attacker finds a place where the parser does not check for size of an argument

## Solutions:

IE uses safe memory APIs, automated code review tools and fuzz testing

# IE6 running with Admin Rights

IExplore.exe

## Admin-Rights Access

HKLM

Program Files

## User-Rights Access

HKCU

My Documents


Startup Folder

## Temp Internet Files

Untrusted files & settings



# IE6 running with Admin Rights





# Low Rights IE on Vista

LoRIE

Integrity Control

## Admin-Rights Access

HKLM  
HKCR  
Program Files


## User-Rights Access

HKCU  
My Documents  
Startup Folder


## Temp Internet Files

Untrusted files & settings


# Low Rights IE on Vista



# Low Rights IE on Vista




# Low Rights IE on Vista



Bad Ax

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help



# Evil web hosting

\*control built by

Local File:  
☐ D:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Micro...

Local File Contents:

FORMAT C:

CreateFile

Done Internet

Virtual PC Console

File Action Help

Windows XP  
Running

New...  
Settings...  
Remove  
Close...

Documents

Startup Search

View Favorites Tools Help

Share

Size	Type	Date Modified
This folder is empty.		

For testing purposes only. Build 5071 x86\_dev.090522-177



Even web page on the internet,  
hosting a vulnerable control\*

*\*control built by test for the demo*

LocalFile:

C:\Documents and Settings\IE Demo\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\evil.bat



Local File Contents:

FORMAT C:



CreateFile

Done

Internet










For testing purposes only. Build 5071 x86\_x64\_dev.090522-177





# Low Rights IE on Vista





For testing purposes only. Build 5071.1x64\_x-ww-090522-177



For testing purposes only. Build 5071 x86\_x64\_dev.090522-177

